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Abstract 
The concept of exchanging goods and services over the Internet has seen an exponential growth in popularity 
over the years. The Internet has been a major breakthrough of online transactions, leaping over the hurdles of 
currencies and geographic locations. However, the anonymous nature of the Internet does not promote an 
idealistic environment for transactions to occur. The increase in online transactions has been added with an equal 
increase in the number of attacks against security of online systems.  
Auction sites and e-commerce web applications have seen an increase in fraudulent transactions. Some of these 
fraudulent transactions that are executed in e-commerce applications happen due to successful computer 
intrusions on these web sites. Although a lot of awareness has been raised about these facts, there has not yet 
been an effective solution to adequately address the problem of application-based attacks in e-commerce. 
This paper proposes a fraud detection system that uses different anomaly detection techniques to predict 
computer intrusion attacks in e-commerce web applications. The system analyses queries that are generated 
when requesting server-side code on an e-commerce site, and create models for different features when 
information is extracted from these queries. Profiles associated with the e-commerce application are 
automatically derived from a training dataset. 
Keywords: Fraud Detection, Fraud Auditing, e-commerce audit, anomaly systems, web attacks prevention 
1. Introduction 
E-commerce applications are prime targets for criminal attacks. Bolton and Hand (2002) explain that new types 
of fraud have emerged such as mobile telecommunications fraud and computer intrusion whilst traditional fraud, 
for instance money laundering, has become easier. Finding the best possible way against fraud is crucial. 
Different processes have to be implemented in order to protect clients from attackers perpetrating fraud. Fraud 
Prevention and Fraud Detection are the two (2) classes under which these processes are generally defined. 
Fraud Prevention is the process of implementing measures to stop fraud from occurring in the first place (Bolton 
& Hand, 2002). Prevention is considered the first line of defence, where most fraud is halted at the very 
beginning. There are different types of Fraud Prevention techniques which can be associated with e-commerce 
applications, such as Internet security systems for credit card transactions, passwords and tokens to name but a 
few. However, in practise Fraud Prevention techniques are not perfect and sometimes a compromise must be 
reached between expense and inconvenience (e.g. to a customer) on one hand, and effectiveness on the other 
(Bolton & Hand, 2002). Nonetheless, Fraud Prevention can sometimes fail due to vulnerabilities in the system 
and here is where Fraud Detection is needed. 
Fraud Detection is the process of identifying fraud as quickly as possible once it has been perpetrated, with 
minimal damage conceivable. The processes falling under this class are said to be the second line of defence. 
When preventive methods fail, Fraud Detection kicks-in. Fraud Detection is an evolving discipline because of 
the fact that once a detection method becomes known, criminal minds will adapt their strategies and try others 
methods to circumvent it. In addition, new criminals enter the field, with different capabilities and different 
mind-sets. If a detection method becomes known by attackers, it does not mean that it is no longer needed. On 
the contrary, some inexperienced attackers might not be aware of any detection methods that were successful, 
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thus, giving us the edge to detect them. 
Although continuous security improvements are installed in auction sites or e-commerce web applications, in 
practise research has shown that almost every online system has some type of vulnerability which can be 
exploited to commit fraud (Jaquith, 2002). Even though online identity verification methods are nowadays more 
sophisticated, illegal activity is still not totally prevented and criminal activity is still successful. 
Fraud Detection systems are often derived from statistical tools which are based on the comparison of observed 
data with expected values. In contrast, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is often used to detect Computer 
Intrusion. The observed data in these statistical tools is generally based on behaviour profiles, including past 
behaviour. The problem, with statistical tools is the way expected values are derived, since it is determined by 
the environment context for which the statistical tools are built for. There cannot be a general, 
all-encompassing-statistical tool; a one-for-all tool.  
Statistical Fraud Detection methods are categorised into Supervised and Unsupervised methods. Supervised 
methods involve techniques which observe training data and construct models based on what has been analysed. 
In most cases, the observed data includes both fraudulent and legitimate cases. However, adaptability is of a 
concern with these statistical methods, since they can only be used to detect fraud which has previously 
occurred.  
Unsupervised methods, on the contrary, do not require any training data, but try to find dissimilarities in 
unlabelled data. Sometimes there are cases when training data is not available, or is very hard to get, thus giving 
rise to unsupervised methods. One of the difficulties with this type of statistical method is accuracy because they 
commonly create high volumes of false-positives and false-negatives. Any fraudulent case detected, involves a 
considerable amount of analysis and resources to identify the real cause and security implications. 
False-positives are of particular concern since a lot of time and resources are wasted to analyse cases which in 
reality were genuine. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are used to detect any kind of attack launched against entire computer 
networks. IDSs can also be used to detect web-based attacks by configuring them with a number of signatures 
that support the data of known attacks (Kruegel, Vigna, & Robertson, 2005). The problem with IDSs is that it is 
very hard to keep signature sets updated with the latest known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, new vulnerabilities 
must first be discovered before signatures can be applied to protect against them, at which stage it might be too 
late. In addition, when custom e-commerce applications are developed in-house, new vulnerabilities might be 
introduced especially when business updates are installed. In practise, it is a very time-intensive and error-prone 
activity to develop ad-hoc signatures to detect attacks against these applications, apart from the fact that 
substantial security expertise is also required. 
The aim of the research is to develop a Fraud Detection System based on anomaly intrusion detection. The goal 
is to reduce the number of fraudulent transactions perpetrated through computer intrusion attacks in e-commerce 
sites. The objective is to use data mining models to detect anomalies as a second line of defence, when 
preventive methods fail.  
2. Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Fraud Detection 
The biggest problem in the e-commerce industry is fraud. Yufeng et al. (2004) explains that computer intrusion is 
an activity which leads to fraud and intrusion attacks on e-commerce web applications. Yufeng et al. (2004) 
states that fraud cases are generally identified from the huge available data sets such as logged data and user 
behaviour. The data collected through logs and user behaviour, can be a great advantage for fraud detection in 
order to learn from the recent attacks. Phua et al. (2010) states that in the area of automatic fraud detection there 
is lack of publicly available real data to conduct experiments on, and lack of published and well-researched 
methods and techniques. This was concluded in a survey that categorises, compares and summarises most 
published and technical articles in automated fraud detection within the last ten (10) years.  
The problem is that legal and competitive complications within e-commerce make it extremely hard for 
researchers to obtain real data from companies. Real e-commerce data is very difficult to get access to since it 
contains personal information that, if made public, would lead to legal issues with data protection laws. In 
addition, real data could also reveal potential vulnerabilities present in e-commerce site, resulting in a loss of 
confidence in the service being offered whilst giving rise to further attacks. Furthermore, Phua et al. (2010) 
concluded that automated fraud detection in the area of e-business and e-commerce is still a big challenge for 
researchers. 
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Bolton and Hand (2002) have shown that statistics and artificial intelligence (AI) are effective techniques for 
fraud detection. Powerful AI techniques, including neural networks and rule-based methods, have proved to be 
very effective in many applications. However, supervised fraud detection relies heavily on the correctness of the 
training set used. On the contrary, Bolton and Hand (2002) explain that unsupervised fraud detection is generally 
used when there are no prior sets of legitimate and fraudulent observations. Such methods include profiling and 
outlier detection methods (Bolton & Hand, 2002). 
Brause, Langsdorf and Hepp (1999) addressed the problem of credit card fraud by combining data mining 
techniques and neural network algorithms to obtain high fraud coverage with a low false alarm rate. The 
symbolic features of fraud transactions were rated using a generalisation graph of rules and neural networks of 
the Radial Basis Function type rated analog features. To better detect credit card fraud, Bhattacharyya et al. 
(2011) evaluate the use of two data mining approaches known as support vector machines and random forests. 
Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) conclude that both techniques showed adequate ability to model fraud but random 
forests demonstrated an overall better performance when evaluated against performance metrics.  
2.2 Computer Intrusion 
Tan (2002) states that the two most common types of online fraud are conducted in auction sites and web 
applications which offer general retail merchandising. In general online fraud is achieved through identity theft; 
a term used to refer to all types of crime in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s 
personal data in activities that involve fraud or deception, typically for economic gain.  
The most common attacks performed on e-commerce applications include Denial of Service Attacks, SQL 
Injection, Cross-site Scripting (XSS), manipulation of hidden fields, Buffer overflows, malicious software, spam 
emails, phishing and Brute Force attacks (Almadhoob & Valverde 2014).  
Lee, Low and Wong (2002) explains that SQL injection is a subset of Injection attacks, and is used to retrieve 
sensitive data, such as credit card numbers and personal medical histories, from databases which are accessible 
through online systems. Mookhey (2010) defines SQL injection as the insertion of SQL meta-characters in user 
input, such that attackers’ queries are executed by the back-end database.  
Cross-site Scripting (XSS) is another common attack that targets the end-user and takes advantage of the lack of 
input and output validations on the web application. It can also be achieved by relying on users’ trust in clicking 
on a URL which serves XSS attacks. Black hats try to embed client side scripting code (such as JavaScript), by 
supplying it as part of the input. The main goal of this nature is to steal user’s session ID from cookies, so as to 
impersonate the victim, and perform online transactions within the lifetime of the session. 
Some payment gateways and online shopping carts also suffer from manipulation of hidden values. The 
vulnerability is often exposed by having total payable prices of purchased goods stored as a hidden HTML fields 
in a dynamically generated web page. A user can easily modify the value of this hidden field using proxies, 
before submitting the request to the server. Repeated attacks of this nature can potentially cripple the viability of 
the online merchant. Such vulnerabilities are not limited to price fields, but can also be used to tamper with 
personal data. 
Less common attacks on e-commerce applications, but which exist nonetheless, include buffer overflows in 
which attackers send very large values in the input field or HTP header parameters to make the back-end 
scripting engine unable to parse the request and display errors which might reveal information about the server 
or code. This will give further insight on how to perform more refined attacks on the system.  
Often identity authentications, within web applications, do not prohibit multiple failed logins and these can be 
attacked using Brute Force techniques. Similarly, if user credentials are sent as clear text, an attacker sniffing the 
traffic will easily discover the user’s credentials and commit fraud via identity theft. Encrypting can easily be 
implemented in a web application through Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS). 
Nonetheless, it is important that password policies are implemented and strong enough, to make it hard for 
malicious users to crack down user’s credentials using dictionary attacks. 
2.3 Data Mining and Web Logs 
The following section explains how to detect the most critical web application flaws from web application logs. 
Meyer (2008) explains that a detailed analysis of users’ action can be extracted from the web application log files 
and these can reveal a lot of information about the behaviour of users. However, web server logs do not capture 
everything and have some limitations since they contain only a fraction of the full HTTP request and response. 
HTTP (stands for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) is the protocol used by web browsers to communicate with the 
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server. The flow in this protocol is one way; the client makes a request to the server and the latter responds. The 
request contains the location of the web page that the server needs to deliver.  
The request created by the client is packaged in chunks defined as request headers and request body, which 
defined what resources need to be served back to the client. The server parses the request to identify what is 
requested and returns a response message with a response status that describes if the request was successful or 
not, response headers containing meta-information about the result data and the content that was requested which 
is known as the response body.  
A lot of information can be extracted from web logs. Feng and Murtagh (2000) propose a solution to extract 
information related to user behaviour from HTTP web logs. In their proposal, a transaction profile is generated 
for each user which contains information related to transactions and session from the browsing site. One problem 
in such a solution is that the extracted data is determined by the standard used to generate logs available and their 
quality. If traces are not logged and/or not detailed enough, the transaction model will not be able to extract the 
information (Feng & Murtagh, 2000). In such a system, a data mining framework has to be written for each web 
application, unless a standard way of generating logs is implemented. 
The logs of a web application must follow a specific standard, if we want to apply data mining techniques to any 
web application. Application logs rarely follow a standard, since developers follow their own or company’s 
standards. However, server logs commonly follow the Common Log Format (CLF) standard, and that is why 
data mining techniques will be applied on such information. 
2.4 Intrusion Detection Systems 
Simple secure processes are no longer sufficient with today’s complex intrusion detection problems. Nowadays, 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are installed on networks, to monitor traffic and system activities for 
malicious attacks and report any incidents that are found. The primary concern of IDS is to alert an administrator 
of any intrusion attempts, though some IDSs are configured to stop them in the first place. An IDS is classified 
under two domains: Misuse Detection and Anomaly Detection. 
Penya, Ruiz-Agúndez and Bringas (2011) state that the first efficient methodology was misuse detection, which 
recognised malicious behaviours based on a knowledge base of rules. Misuse behaviour is when an individual 
deviates significantly from the established normal usage profiles. A misuse detection system uses patterns of 
well-known attacks or weak spots of the system to match and identify known intrusion patterns and signatures.  
The main disadvantages of a misuse IDS is that it cannot automatically detect any new threats, unless new rules 
are added to its knowledge base, and as the set grows, the time to analyse the request may increase to a certain 
extent that it might no longer be viable as a real time system.  
Anomaly Detection adopts the same concept as misuse detection. However, instead of using static pre-defined 
rules to detect intrusions, the set of rules get defined through a learning process. The anomaly detection has two 
phases; training and detection. The training phase involves the analysis of legitimate traffic in which certain 
features and characteristics of normal usage are recorded. The goal of this phase is to define how normal 
accepted traffic looks, and ultimately create the dynamic set of rules (Meyer, 2008). During detection, the system 
will compare the passing traffic against the rule-set created during the training phase, and any deviations from 
this rule-set will be labelled as anomalous.  
The basic assumption in anomaly detection is that anomalous behaviour differs from normal behaviour and the 
difference can be expressed quantitatively or qualitatively. Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005), and Corona 
and Giacinto (2010) present different techniques to extract information from an HTTP request, which later can 
be applied to profile the behaviour of normal traffic in web applications. Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005), 
and Corona and Giacinto (2010), in the solutions proposed, take advantage of specific characteristics in the 
HTTP protocol and web applications in general, to model the legitimate behaviour within the application. 
Anomaly detection can be easily performed once the profiles have been established and trained. The proposed 
models can be used to detect fraud perpetrated through computer intrusion in e-commerce web applications. 
3. Methods and Realization 
3.1 Data Collection 
An e-commerce honeypot is deployed on the web to collect data. The goal of the honeypot is to attract fraudsters 
to attack the e-commerce site and gather information about their attack methods, which lead to fraudulent 
transactions. 
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(1) Statistical Distribution of Non-Negative Integer Values (Model A) 
The role of this model is to learn the statistical distribution pattern in the feature values under study. The main 
assumption is that the features must always be a positive integer value or zero. If the feature can allow negative 
values then it is not suitable for this model. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the features profiles used by the proposed system 
Feature Attacks Model 
Length of attribute parameters Buffer overflow attacks / XSS attacks / SQL 
injections  
Model A (a model for each 
attribute) 
Character distribution of 
attribute parameters 
XSS attacks / SQL injections / Code 
injections 
Model B (a model for each 
attribute) 
Abnormal token value within 
attribute parameter 
Attacks that inject malicious input on 
attributes with enumerations 
Model C (a model for each 
attribute) 
Absence / Abnormal presence 
of attributes 
Any attack that injects malicious input on 
uncommon attributes 
Model D (a model for each 
page) 
Ordering of attribute 
parameters 
Any attack that manually changes the order 
of attributes  
Model E (a model for each page)
Request Method Information gathering / probing / Cross Site 
Tracing (XST) 
Model D (a model for web 
application) 
HTTP Version Information gathering / probing Model D (a model for web 
application) 
Length of HTTP Header 
attributes  
Buffer overflow attacks leveraging on header 
input  
Model A (a model each request 
header) 
Character Distribution in 
HTTP Header attributes 
Code injection attacks leveraging in the 
header 
Model B (a model for each 
request header) 
Frequency Access Information gathering / automated 
discovering of vulnerabilities in web 
application 
Model A (a model for web 
application) 
Request Uri Information gathering / probing / Illegal 
access of web pages 
Model D (a model for web 
application) 
 
The model is based on the assumption that the higher the value of	ݔ௜, the lower the likelihood that it is legitimate. 
Consider the training set ܵ ∈ ሼݔଵ, ݔଶ, . . , ݔேሽ where each element is a whole number, i.e. ݔ ∈ Գ଴. During 
learning the value of the mean ߤ and variance ߪଶ is calculated on the sample to approximate the statistical 
distribution. The values of ߤ and ߪଶ are calculated as follows (Kruegel, Vigna, & Robertson, 2005): 
 ߤ ൌ ∑ ௫೔௡௡௜ୀଵ  (1) 
 ߪଶ ൌ ∑ ሺ௫೔ିఓሻమ௡௡௜ୀଵ  (2) 
To compute the legitimacy of the value under test, the distance from the mean ߤ for a random variable X of the 
statistical distribution is calculated. The calculation uses Chebyshev inequality function. However, only the 
upper bound of the probability calculation is appropriate since it is assumed that a value which is greater than the 
mean is said to be malicious. The probability that the value ݔ is legitimate is defined as follows (Corona & 
Giacinto, 2010): 
 ݌ሺݔ	is	legitimateሻ ൌ ൝݌〈|Χ െ ߤ| ൒ 	 |ݔ െ ߤ|〉 ൌ 	
ఙమ
ሺ௫ିఓሻమ 	 , ݔ ൐ ߤ
1, otherwise
 (3) 
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(2) Statistical Distribution of Symbols (Model B) 
The discussed model captures the feature’s pattern by analysing the statistical distribution of the symbols within 
the values. The feature under analysis is assumed to have a regular structure (i.e. not random) with printable 
characters. The algorithm, as proposed by Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005), is based on the frequency 
values of symbols within the values of the feature. The concept is based on relative frequencies of the 
alphabetical characters, numbers and special symbols. The value of the feature is assumed to be human readable 
implying that there will be more alphabetical and numerical characters than the other symbols. 
In learning mode, the total number of alphabetical characters, numerical digits and special symbols are each 
counted for every value in the training set. Unlike Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005) model, the frequency 
counts are separated into three (3) bins; one for alphabetical characters, one for numerical characters and one for 
special symbols. Once the model has traversed the entire training set, the mean value ߤ of each observed feature 
in each bin is calculated. The relative frequency is used instead of the absolute frequency because the unity of the 
three (3) bins needs to add up to one, without any preferences to other values with higher absolute frequencies. 
To better understand the behaviour of the model, let’s consider a feature with the value p@$$w0rd1024. The 
frequency count for alphabetical characters, numerical characters and special symbols would be 4, 5, and 3 
respectively, and the relative distribution value would be 0.33, 0.42, and 0.25. The relative bin value is stored 
and once the entire training set has been observed, the mean ߤ is calculated. 
During detection, the frequency of the three (3) bins of the value under test is counted. The frequency count is 
normalised to get the relative frequency. The detection algorithm uses the Pearson ߯ଶ-test (chi-squared test) as a 
‘goodness-of-fit’ (Kruegel, Vigna, & Robertson, 2005), to determine the probability that, the obtained 
distribution is a sample drawn from the expected statistical distribution of symbols. 
Let the set ܧ௜ be the expected frequencies for the three (3) bins calculated during the learning phase, and the set 
௜ܱ be the normalised frequencies of the three (3) bins of the value under investigation. The ߯ଶ value is 
calculated as follows: 
 ߯ଶ ൌ 	∑ ሺை೔ିா೔ሻா೔
ଶ௜ୀ଴  (4) 
The degree of freedom of the ߯ଶ-test is two (2) since it is the number of bins used minus one. The actual 
probability value ݌ is derived from the associated value in the ߯ଶ-distribution graph or from a predefined table. 
(3) Token Finder (Model C) 
Consider a feature value ݔ where ݔ ∈ ܶ and ܶ is a set of predefined values referred to as enumeration.  An 
enumerable feature is one that has all its values elements of the predefined set ܶ. The goal of this model is to 
detect if a feature is categorised as enumerable or random, and to learn all the combinations of the enumeration. 
When a feature is said to be enumerable and a value	ݔ ∉ ܶ, then it is considered an anomalous. On the contrary, 
when a feature is said to be random, anomalies cannot be detected. 
The classification of features should be based on the analysis that the values are bound by an unknown threshold 
ݐ when enumerable while in the other case these values are mostly random. A feature can be classified as 
random when the number of different values grows proportional to the total number in the training set. In 
contrast, if the increase is inversely proportionally then it is assumed that the feature follows an enumeration. 
Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005) suggest using statistical correlation to detect if a feature is enumerable or 
random. Let ݌ be the statistical correlation between the values of the functions ݂ and	݃, for increasing 
numbers 1,… , ݅ of occurrences of attribute	ܽ, where the functions ݂ and ݃ are defined as follows:  
 ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ݔ (5) 
 ݃ሺݔሻ ൌ ቐ
݃ሺݔ െ 1ሻ ൅ 1, ݔ௧௛value	of	ܽ	is	new
݃ሺݔ െ 1ሻ െ 1, ݔ௧௛value	of	ܽ	exists	
0, ݔ	 ൌ 0				
 (6) 
Once the training set has been observed and learnt, the correlation parameter ݌ is calculated using the following 
formula: 
 ݌ ൌ ஼௢௩௘௥ሺ௙,௚ሻඥ௏௔௥ሺ௙ሻൈ௏௔௥ሺ௚ሻ (7) 
Where ܸܽݎሺ݂ሻ and ܸܽݎሺ݃ሻ is the variance of ݂ and ݃ respectively and ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎሺ݂, ݃ሻ is the covariance of ݂ 
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and ݃ together. 
A negative value of ݌ indicates that ݂ and ݃ are negatively correlated, and thus an enumeration is assumed. 
On the other hand, when the value ݌ is positive then a positive correlation is indicated meaning that a random 
feature can be assumed. The set of enumerations observed is stored once the learning phase is complete and an 
enumeration is assumed. The model assumes that the complete set of enumerations is found in the training set in 
the case of an enumerable feature. 
The detection process is straightforward since when the value of ݌ is positive, the model will always return 1 
and when the value of ݌ is negative the model checks that the value of the attribute under test is an element of 
the enumeration set. If that is the case, the model returns 1 and 0 on the contrary. 
(4) Abnormal Presence and Presence of Features (Model D) 
The absence or abnormal presence of certain features within a request can be an indica-tive sign of malicious 
attack. This is normally achieved by manually manipulating the requests using specialised programs. The model 
discussed in the following section deals with observing that certain features which are regular are kept and alert 
only when irregular features are present or absent. 
The idea behind this model is simple; the model observes the set of features	ܵ ∈ ሼݔଵ, ݔଶ, . . , ݔேሽ and stores whilst 
traversing the training set. Once the learning phase is complete, a distinct set of features is created. The set ܵ 
will be used to detect anomalies related to abnormal presence or absence. 
For the detection of abnormal presence or absence features, the algorithm observes the set of features ܵ௤ of the 
request under test. It then performs a lookup in the current distinct set and if any feature	ݔ௜ ∈ ܵ௤, ݔ௜ ∉ ܵ, the 
model returns	0, and 1 on the contrary. Also, all the features in ܵ should be present in ܵ௤ i.e. ∀	ݔ ∈ ܵ: ݔ ∈ ܵ௤. 
This means that all features observe abnormal characteristics. This implies that the set ܵ ൌ ܵ௤ for every request 
excluding the order of values. If that is not the case, the request is considered to be irregular and 0 is returned. 
(5) Irregular Ordering of Features (Model E) 
There are instances when a change in order can be an indicative sign of malicious intervention. Attackers who try 
to exploit web vulnerabilities pay little attention to the order of features (Kruegel, Vigna, & Robertson, 2005). 
The model discussed hereunder is responsible to detect any irregularities in the order of values of a specific 
feature. 
During the learning phase, the model observes the set of values of a specific feature and records the order whilst 
traversing the training set. Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005) suggest constructing a directed graph with the 
orders of values as directed edges. A value ݔ௦ precedes another value ݔ௧ when ݔ௦ and ݔ௧ appear together and 
ݔ௦ comes before ݔ௧ in the ordered list of values. The order of constraints is defined as the following set 
 ܱ ൌ	 ቄ൫ݔ௜, ݔ௝൯:	ݔ௜precedes	ݔ௝	and	ݔ௜,ݔ௝ ∈ ቀܵ௤ೕ ∶ 	 ∀݆ ൌ 1…݊ቁቅ (8) 
The set of attribute pairs ܱ is generated through the use of a directed graph. Let ܩ be a directed graph where	ܸ, 
the set of vertices, contains all the distinct values and ݒ௜ is associated with the value	ݔ௜. For every feature ݍ௝ 
(where	݆ ൌ 1…݊) that is analysed during the learning phase, the ordered list of its values ݔଵ, ݔଶ, … , ݔ௜ is 
observed. For each value pair ሺݔ௦, ݔ௧ሻ in this list with ݏ ് ݐ and	ݏ ൒ 1, ݐ ൑ ݅, a directed edge is inserted into 
the graph from ݒ௦	to	ݒ௧. 
Upon completion of the learning phase, the graph ܩ would contain all distinct values in ܸ and all order 
constraints observed from the queries, represented as either an edge between two vertices or a path over a series 
of directed edges. The only problem is that the graph could potentially have cycles as a result of precedence 
relationship. To remove these cycles Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005) suggest using Tarjan’s algorithm 
(Tarjan, 1972) to identify all strongly connected components. Once these components have been identified and 
exist in the graph, all the edges connecting the vertices of the same component are removed. 
The model constructs a set of ordered constructs	ܲ, to detect any irregularities in the ordering of values, such that 
all the value pairs ሺݔ௝, ݔ௞ሻ with ݆ ് ݇ and ݆ ൒ 1, ݇ ൑ ݅ are analysed to detect any potential violations. A 
violation occurs when for any value pair	ሺݔ௝, ݔ௞ሻ, the corresponding pair with swapped elements ሺݔ௞, ݔ௝ሻ is an 
element of	ܱ. In such a case, the model returns	0, and 1 on the contrary. 
3.2.2 Feature Profiles for the Fraud Detection System 
A common observation in web applications is that the length of a query attribute does not vary significantly. 
Generally, query attributes have fixed sized tokens (such as session identifiers or flag variables) or consists of 
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short strings derived from human input (like name and surname input to an HTML form). The variation of 
lengths within query attributes is not much and sometimes form inputs are also bound with a maximum length. 
The intervention of malicious behaviour may considerably change the length of input parameters. For example 
an attacker would pad the input with extra characters, to perform a buffer overflow attack. A Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS) attack might require an increased amount of scripting data to launch the attack. In both cases, the length of 
the parameter value increases thus differentiating from the norm. The model, as proposed by Kruegel, Vigna and 
Robertson (2005), allows minor deviations from the normal by genuine users. The model does not allow requests 
with attributes of length greater than the normal unless very large attribute lengths are not the norm. 
Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005) observed that query attributes, in general, have a regular structure that 
contains only printable characters and their values are often human-readable. The model under discussion 
captures the normal patterns of the query attributes by analysing its character distribution. For example, in an 
HTML form, when the user is asked for a name and surname, the likely values submitted would be made up of 
alphanumeric characters. The common trend is that the name and surname of a user do not have special 
characters. 
The algorithm, as proposed by Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005), is based on frequency values of characters 
within the query attribute. The concept is based on relative frequencies of alphabetical characters, numbers and 
special symbols. Attacks such as XSS use script related tags, full of special symbols, which are embedded into 
the parameter. Other attacks, such as buffer overflow, pad the string with the same character (normally a 
whitespace). In both cases, the values tend to deviate from the normal distribution of characters to launch the 
attack. 
Input attribute parameters in web applications often require one out of a small set of values called enumerations. 
Typically these attributes can be flags or indices. The goal of this model is to primarily detect when an attribute 
parameter can be categorized as enumerable or random. If an attribute is enumerable then anomalies can be 
detected when any attribute value is not an element of the enumeration set. On the contrary, when an attribute is 
random, anomaly detections cannot be detected. 
As users navigate through a website, client side code automatically sends data to the server via attribute value 
pairs. The attribute value pairs are either submitted in the URL using GET methods or in the HTML form data 
using POST methods (the approach is changing with the new REST standards, though the concept is still the 
same). Usually the attribute names are static and do not change, resulting in a high regularity in the number and 
name of parameters. Attackers, who try to exploit web vulnerabilities, pay little attention to the completeness of 
the parameters (Kruegel, Vigna, & Robertson, 2005). This model assumes that the absence or abnormal presence 
of one or more parameters in a query might indicate malicious behaviour. 
During the learning phase, the model observes the set of attribute parameter names making the requests whilst 
traversing the training set. Once the learning phase is complete, a distinct set of attributes is created for each 
page requested. This set will be used to detect any abnormal presence or absence of attribute parameters. 
As explained earlier, since automatic client-side programs construct the request, it is assumed that legitimate 
invocations of server-side programs often contains the same parameters in the same order. Client-side programs, 
in general, preserve the relative order of attribute parameters within a request. Malicious attackers pay little 
attention to the order of attribute parameters when hand-crafting the attack via specialised programs. This model 
will test the consistency of the order of attribute parameters, and in assuming that irregular order of parameter 
indicates malicious behaviour, will raise alarms when these irregularities are discovered. 
The HTTP protocol offers different methods that can be used to perform actions on the web server. Although, the 
most widely used methods are GET and POST, other methods exist which include HEAD, PUT, DELETE, 
TRACE, OPTIONS and CONNECT. Some of these HTTP methods are used by developers to test their system. 
However, if a web server is misconfigured, these methods can potentially pose a security risk (OWASP, 2008). 
Sometimes attackers create hand-crafted HTTP requests of different method types, to gather information about 
the web server and to know how to establish attacks. The proposed mode uses the Absence & Presence model to 
analyse all the method types within the training set of legitimate users. The request type model assumes that the 
training set contains requests with all method types which are considered legitimate. It also assumes that a 
request with a method type which is not within the training set is an indication of malicious behaviour. 
OWASP (2008) explains that to gather information about the web server, attackers send malformed requests or 
request non-existent pages to the server. An example used is GET / HTTP/3.0. To detect malicious behaviour via 
HTTP version, the token finder model is used. Legitimate requests are used as a training set and it is assumed 
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that any legitimate HTTP version is included in the set. Requests with other HTTP versions, which are not part of 
the distinct set of the model, are considered to be malicious behaviour. 
Attackers do not only manipulate attribute parameters within the request, but also request headers. The length 
distribution of request headers is often unchanged since request headers, like attribute parameters, are often fixed 
sized tokens. 
The intervention of malicious behaviour sometimes considerably changes the length of input parameters. The 
same model used for attribute length, is used to detect anomalies in header requests. The model will not allow 
request header parameters with very large length that deviate from the norm. 
It is observed that request headers have a regular structure and often contains only printable characters that can 
be human-readable. Using the character distribution model, the normal patterns of the request headers are 
analysed and learnt.  
The algorithm, as proposed by Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson (2005), is based on frequency values of the 
characters within the request headers. The concept is based on relative frequencies of the alphabetical characters, 
numbers and special symbols. Attacks such as XSS use scripts related tags, full of special symbols, which are 
embedded into the header. It is assumed that malicious intervention will tend to deviate from the normal 
distribution of characters and thus anomaly can be detected. 
Attackers probing any web application will tend to use automatic tools which help in finding web applications 
vulnerabilities. The frequency at which these automated tools submit requests is generally much faster than a 
human’s standard rate. The goal of the access frequency model is to observe and learn the frequency at which 
clients submit requests. The idea is to analyse how many requests are submitted in total on each page of the web 
application and by each individual client (assuming that distinct IPs are distinct clients). 
Consider an e-commerce site with a login and review feature. Analysing the frequencies at which these two 
pages are accessed, one would observe that the authentication page is called less frequently by each individual 
client since it is only used to login once. However, the total access frequency for the authentication page is very 
high since it is accessed by many clients. On the other hand, the review page is accessed in bursts by an 
individual use who is reading reviews about a particular product. However, the total access frequency for the 
review page can be low since not every client looks at the reviews of a product before buying it. 
An irregular burst of invocations may indicate an attacker probing for vulnerabilities. Though the method can 
indicate irregularities, an attacker can easily trick the model by slowing the rate at which invocations are 
requested. However, most of the hacking tools available do not support such features. Furthermore, once a 
vulnerability hole is identified and becomes wide spread, more individuals attack the web applications, thus 
raising the total frequency to a suspicious level. 
The request Uri-model works under the principle that the e-commerce application serves a number of different 
pages and resources to the client. However, the web server also has a set of different programs that are used by 
system administrators to configure the system properties and to maintain its operations (Gaarudapuram, 2008). 
The administrative tools include creating logs, configuration of web server settings, authentication and 
authorisation mechanisms and also creation of users and roles. By default, if the web server is not configured 
correctly, the tools are accessible over the network with default passwords that are known to everyone.  
A user with malicious intent would try to access the administrative pages of the web server if available. If an 
attacker succeeds in accessing these administrative tools, he would most likely have administrator privileges that 
allow him to run operating system commands and ultimately take control of the web application. To capture any 
request which is addressed to unknown pages, this model observes the set of pages that are accessible within the 
e-commerce application, takes a note of them, and any request to a page which is not part of the e-commerce 
application, will be an indication of malicious attack. During the learning phase, a distinct set of pages is 
observed. This set is then used to detect any abnormal requests to pages or resources which do not form part of 
the e-commerce application. 
3.3 Installation and Configuration 
To simulate a real world scenario and collect data from real traffic, an e-commerce honeypot is deployed on a 
remote server. Instead of redesigning a new e-commerce web application, it was decided to use osCommerce 
(osCommerce, 2011), a free online shop e-commerce solution that offers a wide range of out-of-the-box features 
and can be setup fairly quickly. OsCommerce is based on the PHP (PHP, 2012) scripting language and the 
benefit of being script-based is that it can be easily modified to purposely add weaknesses to the system. The 
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Table 2. Details of an example of a log entry in CLF 
Token Description Example 
127.0.0.1 - joe [04/Nov/2011:10:11:22 -0500] "GET /catalog/index.php HTTP/1.1" 200 12345 
"http://www.decommerceproject.com" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bo
Host Fully qualified domain name of client or 
remote address (IP) 
127.0.0.1 
Ident Identity reported by client when 
IdentityCheck is enabled and client runs 
identd 
- 
Authuser The userid of the client making the 
request which is determined by HTTP 
authentication if required 
Joe 
Timestamp The time when the server finished 
processing the request. The time is given 
in between squared brackets 
[28/Jan/2012: 09:02:36 –0500] 
Request The request line requested by the client. 
This token is given in between inverted 
commas. 
"GET /catalog/index.php HTTP/1.1" 
Status The HTTP response status code returned 
to the client 
200 
Bytes The number of bytes in the object returned 
to the client excluding all HTTP headers 
12345 
Referrer From which website the request was 
triggered (if any). Basically to identify 
where people are visiting from. The token 
value is given in between double quotes 
"http://www.decommerceproject.com" 
User-agent The clients’ identification of which 
software is being used to submit the HTTP 
request. The token value is given in 
between double quotes so as to escape any 
space symbols found in this token 
"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) 
AppleWebKit/535.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) 
Chrome/16.0.912.63 Safari/535.7" 
 
Although the server provides a lot of information about requests, the main point of research is to collect more 
information. An HTTP logger was also implemented at application level using a scripting language (PHP in this 
case). Since osCommerce is script based, the application logger was easily merged with the framework. The 
KLogger (Katzgrau, 2008) is used to log data into a text file. The logger was slightly modified so as to support 
older version of PHP, and to write in files which are rolled over daily. 
The HTTP Request Log object, captures the information from the request and formats it into a readable format. 
The data captured includes the following request headers: 





 REQUEST_METHOD.  
In addition this object also captures the body of the request such as POST attribute parameters. Each request 
header is printed on a separate line, by first printing the header name, a semi-colon followed by a space and the 
header value. The last to be printed is the request body, both encoded and decoded, and the same format as the 
headers is used. An empty line divides a new request from the previous one.  
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The Application Logger logs all requests which successfully make it to a valid page. However, it does not mean 
that all requests with response status 200 are logged in the application log. There can be hand-crafted requests 
which skip the application logger, in which case Server logs will be the only source of information. 
3.6 Anomaly Detection System Implementation 
The anomaly detection system was developed in Java, and can be executed as a console application. The 
program accepts different arguments as input parameters, which are used to specify what is needed from the 
system. 
The anomaly detection system has two modes of operations; training and detecting. During training, a training 
dataset is supplied to the program and through various data mining techniques, behavioural profiles are 
constructed for different features. The profiles are serialised to xml and saved in a file. The program serialises 
the profiles to save the state of the profiles once the system has been trained. When in detection mode, the 
serialised xml files is loaded and detection can commence.  
During detection mode, the system de-serialises the xml file to reconstruct the models, and generate a score for 
each request that is passed. The anomaly score is determined by the value calculated from each model. The 
models return a value of one (1) or zero (0); the latter indicates a probable anomalous request, while the former 
indicates a probable genuine request. If any of the models returns a 0, then it is assumed that the request is 
anomalous. 
In reality, the values determined by each model are in decimal format, and are stored in the database. The 
decimal value is passed through a threshold filter and if it is less than the threshold, it results in a 0 and if above 
or equal then it returns a 1. However, by default the threshold values of the system are set to 0.5. If the threshold 
needs to be configured, then this can be done manually, by changing the threshold values within the serialised 
xml file. 
4. Results 
The evaluation consists of two phases training and testing. For the training phase, a dataset which was created 
using random variables was used. This dataset was filtered from any malicious attacks and thus it can be 
considered to be legitimate traffic. The dataset contains requests to all the pages of the e-commerce site. During 
training phase the system learns the characteristics from the requests that were supplied. The model values were 
serialised into an xml file so that the profiles are stored and thus the system can be easily switched to detection 
mode. 
To visualise the anomaly counts that were obtained via the anomaly detection system on the data collected, a 
number of bar charts were generated. The charts represent the absolute count of the alerts for each model. 
4.1 Training Systems 
The detection system which is based on supervised learning requires a dataset to be trained. The training data is 
based on legitimate requests, so as to learn the normal process of requests. In an e-commerce web application, 
intrusion attacks are a small ratio when compared to legitimate attacks. However, the scope of the honeypot was 
not to gather legitimate data but to attract malicious attacks. So the data collected from the honeypot cannot be 
used for training. Due to the factors in place, a dataset of legitimate requests had to be generated that can be used 
for training. The data of a simulated user using the e-commerce web applications was gathered and formatted. 
Whilst simulating the user, every single page of the web application and every operation available were 
requested so that no web page is left out form the training dataset. Once the requests were submitted, the server 
logs and application logs were supplied to the log parser to filter them and format them. A total of 507 requests 
were generated by the simulated user.  
However, this was not enough as a training dataset. So instead of simulating other users, the logs of the 
simulated user were replicated with variable data for 99 more users, i.e. a total of 100 users. To replicate this data, 
users with different information were generated randomly or randomly selected from a list of predefined values, 
and the user information within each request was replaced by the random generated values. Other information 
which is not correlated to a user, but to a request, was generated randomly. 
The set ܶ of 50,702 requests were manufactured as the training set for the anomaly detection system. The 
system took approximately five (5) hours to learn the entire dataset	ܶ. Approximately, the system took 0.36 of a 
second to learn each request which shows that the system is quite fast. In addition, the time can be decreased 
further by updating the code to make it more efficient, and remove code which enables logging. 
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4.2 Results of Synthesised Datasets 
There are four (4) possible outcomes when predicting the purpose of requests, which include the following: 
 
Table 3. Possible outcomes in the classification of requests 
True Positive (TP) Requests that are predicted correctly as Anomalous 
False Positive (FP) Requests that are predicted as Anomalous but in reality are Legitimate 
False Negative (FN) Requests that are predicted as Legitimate but in reality are malicious 
True Negative (TN) Requests that are predicted correctly as Legitimate 
 
First, the detection system was supplied with the training dataset, which did not contain any attacks and thus 
could safely be labelled as genuine. 
4.2.1 Brute Force Attacks 
A total of 87 brute force attacks were simulated and labelled as anomalous. Most of these attacks were generated 
using the application named Brutus (HooBieNet, 2002). However, 10 of the attacks were created manually by 
submitting them through the web user interface. Four different method types were used to attack, which include 
GET, HEAD, PUT, and POST. Figure 4 shows the results obtained at different threshold levels, when the attacks 
were submitted to the detection system. The requests that are not identified as anomalous can be considered as 
False Negatives (FN). The number of FNs are independent of the threshold applied, this could be attributed to 
brute force attacks not being able to be filtered by a threshold level. 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of FN requests at different thresholds for Brute Force attacks 
 
Figure 5 displays the models that contributed to the rate of TP during the detection process. After analysing the 
results obtained, it was discovered that a large subset of the brute force attacks were discovered by the Access 
Frequency Model since the attacks were launched without any interval in between. Furthermore, the Model 
responsible with Request type discovered attacks which had been requested using the HEAD and PUT method 
types. The Attribute Character Distribution Model also predicted some requests as being anomalous since the 
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Table 4. Confusion matrix 
 Labelled 
Predicted 
 Legal Fraud 
Legal True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP) 
Fraud False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP) 
 
Table 5. Confusion matrix of the synthesised data set used to test the system 
 Labelled 
Predicted 
 Legal Fraud 
Legal 4808 68 
Fraud 190 562 
 
Table 6. Performance metric 
Metric Name Equation Value 
Accuracy(AC) ܣܥ ൌ ܶܰ ൅ ܶܲܶܰ ൅ ܨܲ ൅ ܨܰ ൅ ܨܲ 0.95 
 
4.4 Evaluation of Data from Honeypot 
The performance of the anomaly detection system calculated before, gives a broad understanding of the accuracy 
in the prediction of the HTTP queries on the e-commerce honeypot system. The data collected on the honeypot 
system ranges from 10th October 2011 to 4th December 2011; 8 weeks of data and a total of 12773 requests. The 
collected data is divided into week batches as follows: 
 
Table 7. Honeypot’s definition of data batches 
 Batch Code From Date To Date No. Requests 
B1  10th October 2011 16th October 2011 4017 
B2  17th October 2011 23rd October 2011 1514 
B3  24th October 2011 30th October 2011 1551 
B4  31st October 2011 6th November 2011 719 
B5  7th November 2011 13th November 2011 495 
B6  14th November 2011 20th November 2011 2290 
B7  21st November 2011 27th November 2011 808 
B8  28th November 2011 4th December 2011 1383 
 
Each batch was passed through the detection system and the results were recorded. After analysing the results of 
each batch, we found that the majority of the requests on the e-commerce honeypot were attacks related to 
information gathering, mostly trying to access the admin section of the e-commerce web application. However, 
there were other requests which are considered as False Positives since they are accessing resources which were 
not included in the training set. Figure 13 contains the number of anomalous requests predicted by the Request 
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can be used to perform fraud. 
E-commerce security within this project is upgraded to another level. The proposed system learns the 
characteristics of e-commerce web applications by creating profiles of the associated HTTP requests. The system 
generates different profiles using supervised learning. Once profiles are created, the system can be used to 
monitor incoming traffic and classify HTTP requests as legitimate or malicious. The profiles generated by the 
system are based on various features which help distinguish anomalies queries from genuine ones.  
The list of features extracted from the HTTP queries include unknown or abnormal ordering of parameters, 
abnormal length and character distribution of HTTP query parameters, illegal use of HTTP protocol versions and 
HTTP methods, abnormal length and character distribution of HTTP header parameters, illegal access to specific 
server resources and access frequency of users.  
The benefit of this proposed system is that profiles are learnt with minimal human interventions unlike other 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The detection capabilities of the system can be adjusted to suit specific needs 
of the business, by tuning the threshold values used for the detection process. 
To evaluate the system, a labelled dataset of HTTP queries including both malicious and genuine queries was 
needed. A good database that contained labelled requests could not be obtained and so synthesised data was 
generated to help us test the system.  
The synthesised legitimate dataset was devised by randomly replacing the values of HTTP queries collected 
from logs (application and server) which were generated by a simulated user. This dataset was used to train the 
system. Attacks were synthesised by constructing malicious HTTP query using attack values obtained from 
Ingham (2006) database infused with legitimate HTTP queries obtained from the simulated user. Nonetheless, 
the dataset of attacks was further increased by performing penetration testing (OWASP, 2008) on the 
e-commerce web application. 
The results of the experiments were presented in this article. From the evaluation it is evident that fraud detection 
in e-commerce can be reduced using data mining techniques together with statistical analysis. With the given 
datasets, our approach proofed to be promising though it might need further full-scale tests and configuration 
flexibilities. The results of the evaluation have been presented as bar-chats to help visualise the performance and 
accuracy of the proposed system. Moreover, these will help system administrators to easily understand the state 
of the system and easily identify attacks, if the system had to be taken to a production scale. 
From the results it is evident that the system successfully detected a high percentage of malicious attacks, but 
there were also a number of false positives and false negatives. In certain scenarios, it is very hard to detect if an 
HTTP query is benign or anomalous from just a simple request. More information is needed in certain cases. 
However, it can be safely assumed that usually a malicious user will submit several different attacks to 
successfully perpetrate fraud, unless he knows all the vulnerabilities of the system already. Thus if not all of the 
HTTP queries are detected as malicious, but the majority are, the system can still be considered useful. By 
grouping the requests into sessions, there is a possibility that the system gives better results.  
The assumptions made in this project, might not be comprehensive since if a new web page is created on the 
website and the system has not learnt of its existence, then the HTTP request to this page will be considered 
anomalous, and that might not be the case. Nonetheless, if a web page has been changed and the attribute 
parameter names changed or the orders changed, then the system must be re-trained with the new parameters 
since all HTTP queries with new parameters will be considered malicious unless the system is trained. 
There is continuous interest in the area of fraud detection in e-commerce. The proposed system is considered a 
novel approach to the detection of computer intrusion attacks in e-commerce web applications. The techniques 
used can be further investigated to reduce the number of false positives to a possible minimum. Furthermore, 
from the results obtained in the evaluation, it is concluded that there is no single technique which works for most 
attacks. The more features are extracted, the more information is gathered and the better the detection outcome. 
However, a balance must be reached between accuracy and efficiency.  
As a future reference, the system should handle the presence of attacks in the training set. If such a feature is 
enabled, the administrators of the web application do not need to collect genuine request to be used as training 
data. Assuming that the majority of the requests in e-commerce are legitimate, the system can be left in training 
mode for a considerable amount of traffic and switched to detection mode, once valid profiles have been 
generated.  
Another problem is that the system does not allow changes in the web application. The web application might 
detect changes as a possible threat. There should be a mechanism in place, that whenever changes are deployed 
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on the web application, the system is trained again to generate new profiles, amend old ones and possibly also 
delete unnecessary ones. Ideally, the system should automatically recognise a change and start training.  
The ultimate goal is to allow the system to perform anomaly detection in real time. The system should be able to 
handle millions of requests per day and ideally the system should not trigger any false alarms. 
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